sentinel
breaches you can verify — and publish without breaking the law
an index of data breaches from public sources and third-party apis. a result for an address goes only to that address — never onto the screen of whoever typed it.
address check
verification gate
nothing is shown before confirmation — not even “no hits”. the address is not stored if the link goes unused for 15 minutes. the query is hashed in the browser (sha-1, 6-char prefix).
→ link sent · valid 15 min · single use
in production this step is the only moment the address exists in a log — as a salted hash, dropped after 24 h.
9datasets indexeddemo · api-fed in production
887datasets in hibpas of may 2025
902Mrecords 2025–2026proton dbo, 2026
0records we holdmetadata only, no record bodies
exposure timeline
2026
SoundCloud
do thisnothing to change on your side — contact data only. expect phishing that imitates soundcloud.
2025
infostealer log (aggregate set)
do thisrotate passwords saved in the browser and turn on a passkey/2fa for e-mail. we never display passwords — check yours in your manager.
2023
PL combolist (CERT Polska)
do thischeck the same address at bezpiecznedane.gov.pl — it names the affected service.
2018
Morele.net
do thisaddress and phone are permanently exposed — treat “parcel” sms as fraud.
record contents are never shown: no passwords, no test results, no document numbers. you see the dataset name, publication date and data classes — enough to know what to change.
observatory
what actually leaked in 2025–2026, from third-party data, with the uncertainty stated
victim sectors
victim size
- 1–249 staff
- 70,5%
- 250–999 staff
- 13,5%
- 1000+ staff
- 15,9%
- source
- proton, 2025
sources disagreeproton reported 794 breaches and 300M+ records for 2025 (2025-10-30); its 2026 update says 512 breaches and 902M+ records “since the start of 2025”. the figures are inconsistent; we do not average them — both are shown, dated.
breach index
region
#entitypublished
recordsclassesstatus
001
ALAB Laboratoriaransomware, leaked in three batches
2023-11-27
~55k
national id health address
confirmed
sekurak
002
PL combolist (CERT Polska)aggregation of infostealer logs
2023-05-29
~6M rows
passwords login url
confirmed
gov.pl
003
Morele.netUODO fine over PLN 3M (2024 decision)
2018-10
~2.2M people
contact passwords
confirmed
rp.pl
004
American Heart of Polandransomware; UODO fine PLN 1,440,549
2025-02
21k+
health hr
confirmed
wolters kluwer
006
Figure Lendingransom refused, 2.5 gb published
2026-01-08
3M
passwords ssn address
confirmed
proton dbo
009
Miljödata (SE)municipal systems supplier
2025-09-15
undetermined
passwords national id
confirmed
proton dbo
nothing matches these filters.
the date is the dataset publication date in the monitored source, not the intrusion date. “unconfirmed” means no statement from the entity — we publish with that label, after contacting them first.
dashboard · journalist / researcher
monitored objects
+ add domain
redakcja@example.pladdress · confirmed 2026-07-12
4 hits
example.pldomain · dns txt verified
12 mailboxes
alab.com.pltopic watch · metadata only
watching
events
export csv
api keys
14:02new dataset: Hallmark · unconfirmed · entity notified 7 days earlier
09:41example.pl — 1 new mailbox in an infostealer log
yest.verification link expired (1) · hash deleted
six decisions that keep sentinel on the clear side of gdpr
what we do not holdno record bodiesno plaintext passwords, no medical results, no document scans, no national id numbers. the database holds dataset metadata (name, publication date, data classes, size) and address hashes only. what is absent cannot be stolen or subpoenaed.
the gateresult only to a confirmed addresstyping an address reveals nothing — not even “no hits”, since a negative answer is also information about a person. results open via a single-use link valid 15 minutes; the session lives 24 h. this closes the look-up-someone-else vector.
national idpesel is never a querysentinel never allows a search by national id, document number or home address. we only state that a dataset contained a “national id” class, and hand off to bezpiecznedane.gov.pl (trusted-profile login) and to the mObywatel pesel-freeze service.
basis and exitart. 6(1)(f) + one-click exitprocessing rests on legitimate interest: telling people their data is exposed. the balancing test and a change log are public, and an objection (art. 21) removes the address hash from the index within 24 h, no reason required.
sourcingthird-party apis, cited in placedata comes from hibp (datasets under cc by 4.0 — attribution required), proton’s observatory, and cert polska / uodo statements. every index row carries a source link and a date. we do not buy dumps and we do not scrape forums ourselves.
disclosurethe entity hears firsta dataset enters the index no sooner than 7 days after we notify the entity and, for polish data, cert polska. silence does not block publication, but the row is labelled “unconfirmed”.
sources